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Resilient or Residual? From the Wage Earners’ Welfare State  
to Market Conformity in New Zealand 
ABSTRACT 
Contemporary research has frequently stressed the resilience of welfare states facing 
internal and external problem pressure or ideologically motivated attacks. Theoretical 
explanations of welfare state change have in part been eclipsed by explanations of its 
remarkable stability. But does the resilience thesis hold? Taking the case of New Zea-
land, this paper demonstrates that under certain conditions major transformation is pos-
sible. Since 1975, New Zealand has changed from being a ‘wage earners’ welfare state’ 
to having only a residual system of social protection. Adopting a qualitative approach, 
the paper describes the process of welfare state retrenchment through different phases 
and discusses what economic and political-institutional conditions account for the un-
usually large extent of cutbacks. Quantitative data confirm the pattern of retrenchment 
with the most extensive cutbacks taking place in the early 1990s under conservative 
rule. This pattern does not, however, bear out the expectation of ‘blame avoidance’ be-
haviour, as assumed by previous research. Despite the unpopularity of retrenchment, 
governments in New Zealand frequently used the opportunities provided by the central-
ised political system to push through highly visible reforms. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 22) 
 
CONTENTS 
1.  INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
2.  THE WAGE EARNERS’ WELFARE STATE IN NEW ZEALAND.............................................3 
3.  FOUR PERIODS OF CHANGE.............................................................................................6 
3.1 1975-1984: Crisis? What Crisis?................................................................................. 6 
3.2 1984-1990: More Market – Less Social Welfare? .................................................... 10 
3.3 1990-1999: Conservative Retrenchment and Restructuring...................................... 14 
3.4 1999-2004: A Third Way? ........................................................................................ 22 
4. HOW MUCH CHANGE? ...................................................................................................25 
5. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................29 
REFERENCES......................................................................................................................33 
APPENDIX..........................................................................................................................40 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ........................................................................................................41 
 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 22) 
- 1 - 
Resilient or Residual? From the Wage Earners’ Welfare State  
to Market Conformity in New Zealand 
1.  INTRODUCTION*  
In the 1970s, the notion of a ‘crisis of the welfare state’ surfaced in the academic debate 
on social policy in Western countries (see Castles 2004). From about the time of the 
first oil shock, the welfare state was frequently considered endangered because the in-
flated expectations of the public clashed with limited fiscal resources. Moreover, the 
welfare state was increasingly regarded as a cause of social and economic problems 
rather than as a way to resolve them. When radically anti-welfare politicians like Mar-
garet Thatcher and Ronald Reagan came to power, it seemed to many as if a generous 
welfare state would soon be a thing of the past. These expectations, however, turned out 
to be exaggerated. Against the backdrop of the ‘crisis of the welfare state’ debate and 
the anti-welfare state rhetoric of New Right politicians, the conclusion drawn as early as 
1988 in a scholarly volume of comparative studies concerning recent welfare state 
changes sounded already somewhat less dramatic:  
“[I]ronically, the welfare state has survived the decay of Keynesian economics and the 
unraveling of party coalitions. The welfare state has not lost its legitimacy, but it has 
lost its luster, and the domestic politics of Western liberal democracies invariably turn 
on conflict over the future of the welfare state. At the same time, the collapse of Keynes-
ian economics leaves the welfare state without an intellectual basis for future progress. 
We thus have a paradoxical state of affairs: a deeply institutionalized welfare state be-
reft of its intellectual and political moorings” (Brown 1988: 7).   
Today, the first part of this paradox – the resilience of  the welfare state – seems to be a 
mainstream view in comparative research (Taylor-Gooby 2002). Paul Pierson’s seminal 
‘Dismantling the Welfare State?’ (1994) again emphasized the difficulties met by re-
formers wishing to cut back welfare programmes, as did the authors of titles such as 
‘The Irreversible Welfare State’ (Therborn/Roebroek 1986) and ‘Survival of the Euro-
pean Welfare State’ (Kuhnle 2000). Moreover, there are numerous examples of reforms 
entailing further expansion or other forms of welfare state ‘restructuring’, often combin-
ing cuts with expansion (Pierson 2001). But the pendulum is now swinging back, with 
many authors pointing out quite extensive retrenchment in some countries during indi-
vidual periods (Allan/Scruggs 2004; Green-Pedersen 2002; Hicks 1999: ch. 7; 
Korpi/Palme 2003; Ross 2000). In general, the conclusion of these studies is that re-
                                                 
*  I would like to thank Francis G. Castles, Claire Fayon, Julia Moser and two anonymous reviewers for helpful 
comments on this paper. 
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trenchment, albeit politically difficult, is by no means impossible and under certain 
conditions even probable.  
On the one hand, a number of factors seem to cause a tendency towards retrench-
ment. Among the conditions often cited as favourable for retrenchment policies are, of 
course, a country’s economic situation, i.e. low economic growth, unemployment, high 
inflation, but also ‘globalisation’ which is usually measured in terms of openness to 
trade and capital. The demographic situation, particularly the elderly dependency ratio, 
is commonly thought important, too. On the other hand, there are also reasons to expect 
less retrenchment. Existing welfare state structures are often regarded as path-
dependent, that is, relatively immune to large change by virtue of their inherent institu-
tional ‘inertia’. There is considerable debate among scholars about the continuing rele-
vance of variables such as pro-welfare state – typically left-wing – parties, working-
class power and formal political institutions for the present-day politics of the welfare 
state. Paul Pierson persuasively argued that these factors, which helped explain the wel-
fare state’s expansion, are inadequate to explain today’s changes (Pierson 1994). In 
short, what we see today, according to Pierson, is a ‘new politics of the welfare state’. If 
or to what extent this is true is still open to debate. 
In this paper, I will look at welfare state development in New Zealand since 1975. 
The study of the changes in New Zealand and their causes may contribute to the more 
general debate whether OECD welfare states ought to be regarded as resilient and im-
mune against radical change. For that reason, I will try to answer the following ques-
tions: How much change can we observe in New Zealand in the long term? Does a par-
ticular pattern of change stand out? What have been the driving forces of welfare state 
change of the last 30 years? Here, I will attempt to highlight a number of relevant fea-
tures of reforms in New Zealand in the context of the comparative debate on welfare 
state restructuring. 
New Zealand is usually seen by comparative researchers as the exemplary case for 
radical welfare state retrenchment (Huber/Stephens 2001; Swank 2002). However, there 
is little in-depth research on the country’s recent welfare state development from a po-
litical science perspective (but see Castles/Gerritsen/Vowles 1996). Most authors make 
do with a rather cursory look at the reforms of the 1990s. In this paper I will not limit 
myself to the early 1990s (when the deepest benefit cuts occurred) and look at the whole 
period from the mid-1970s until the present day, that is, since the country left what has 
come to be called the Golden Age of the welfare state. This long span of time allows me 
to see what happened to the welfare state in one country under different partisan ar-
rangements, economic conditions and, due to the electoral system reform in 1993, even 
under different institutional configurations.  
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is a brief description of the status quo 
ante, i.e. the welfare state arrangement of New Zealand of the post-war decades. In it, I 
will also briefly summarize why New Zealand’s post-war welfare state can be described 
as a ‘wage earners’ welfare state’. Section 3, the main part of the paper, is an historical 
account of the reform period since 1975, which can be divided into four sub-periods, 
according to the partisan orientation of government (sections 3.1 to 3.4).1 In this section, 
I focus on major policy changes in pensions, health care, labour market and social assis-
tance policies, family policy, housing and accident compensation. This focus on the 
‘formal’ welfare state will be complemented by an overview of the major changes in 
‘functional equivalents’, e.g. state intervention in wages and trade protectionism. In 
section 4, the qualitative results will then be compared with some quantitative and com-
parative evidence on welfare state change in New Zealand. Here, I will also ask to what 
extent New Zealand can still be regarded a wage earners’ welfare state. Section 5 con-
cludes with a discussion of the causes of welfare state transformation. 
2.  THE WAGE EARNERS’ WELFARE STATE IN NEW ZEALAND 
The origins of the modern welfare state in New Zealand date back to the late 19th cen-
tury. In 1898, the reform-minded Liberal government introduced an Old Age Pension, a 
flat-rate means-tested pension for poor New Zealanders over 65, making New Zealand 
one of the first countries in the world to introduce a public pension scheme (Overbye 
1997). In the following years, however, the government’s reforming zeal weakened and 
only rarely did significant innovations – such as pensions for widows (1911), miners 
(1915) and the blind (1924) and the world’s first family allowances (1927) – take place.  
It was the Great Depression of the 1930s that led to new initiatives in social policy, 
both directly and indirectly. Directly, as a response to rising unemployment, the gov-
ernment set up public works schemes and for the first time established an Unemploy-
ment Fund in 1930 with a small sustenance allowance to be paid to the unemployed 
(Bassett 1998: 173). Indirectly, economic hardship politically worked against the ruling 
parties, as was the case in most other democratic countries of the era. In New Zealand, 
this trend favoured the Labour Party which defeated the incumbent conservative/liberal 
coalition in the 1935 general election and formed the first Labour government in the 
history of the country. 
The system of social security created by Labour in the years between 1935 and 1949 
covered a wide range of risks such as old age, unemployment, sickness and maternity. 
Most cash benefits, however, were still means-tested, namely those for the working-age 
population. Retirement incomes comprised two elements: A means-tested Age Benefit 
                                                 
1  The choice of partisan composition of government as the organising principle, however, does not mean that it is 
assumed to provide the overriding explanatory factor for welfare state change.  
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at age 60 was supplemented with universal Superannuation at age 65. At the outset, the 
universal pillar was very small and it was to be gradually increased to match the Age 
Benefit, a point eventually reached in 1960. Hospital treatment was made free of charge 
and organised along the lines of a universal and centralised National Health Service. 
Even so, the government did not succeed in extending universality to primary care. Ne-
gotiations with the doctors’ association failed and the result was a largely private system 
of cash-for-service with public subsidies available to pay for some of the fees. In 1945, 
the government removed the means test from family transfers, creating a universal Fam-
ily Benefit which was paid directly to the mother (McClure 1998: 98-111). In housing 
policy, Labour put more resources into both state rentals and cheap loans (Oliver 1977; 
Trlin 1977). At this stage, New Zealand could rightly be called a welfare state pioneer 
(Briggs 1961). 
During the post-war era, the existing structure was left intact. The moderate ideo-
logical distance between New Zealand Labour and the conservative National Party in a 
two-party system and virtual full employment underpinned this standstill at least up 
until the 1970s. Apart from a few minor new benefits and (irregular) increases in the 
rates of existing benefits, there was virtually no change between 1945 and 1972, that is, 
during the exact period when most Western countries had their glory days of welfare 
state expansion. New Zealand was apparently turning into a ‘welfare state laggard’. 
In the early 1970s, the New Zealand government introduced two new schemes. First, 
the Domestic Purposes Benefit (1973), a statutory benefit mainly for lone mothers 
which replaced the discretionary emergency assistance previously available for those 
cases. The second innovation was a broad accident compensation scheme, known as 
ACC2, which came into force in 1974 and covered not only workplace accidents – as the 
previous Workers’ Compensation and as it is common in Western countries – but also 
road accidents and other contingencies (Duncan 2002). The scheme was compulsory 
and based on the ‘no fault’ principle, that is, compensation was provided without proof 
of ‘fault’ whatsoever. In exchange to these comprehensive entitlements, the right to sue 
for damages was abolished. ACC benefits included earnings-related compensation, 
medical and rehabilitation benefits and various lump sum payments. 
In sum, the structure of the formal welfare state of the early 1970s resembled very 
much what is known as the ‘liberal welfare regime’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). In Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen’s regime-typology liberal welfare states are marked by selective, 
means-tested benefit design, relatively modest flat-rate payments, tax-financing and a 
strong emphasis on work incentives. Indeed, most of the major benefits in New Zealand 
                                                 
2  ACC refers to the Accident Compensation Commission, today the Accident Compensation Corporation. Gener-
ally, both the scheme and the provider are known as ACC. 
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were means-tested, with the exception of the Family Benefit, part of the public pension 
and hospital care. Only one scheme – accident compensation – was based on social in-
surance principles. ACC was also the only programme not entirely financed out of gen-
eral revenue3, but primarily from employers’ premiums and levies on motor vehicles. 
New Zealand’s social expenditure development showed below-average growth rates 
during much of the post-war period (OECD 1985). Between 1962 and 1966, social ex-
penditure (including health) actually decreased relative to GDP – from 11.6 per cent in 
1960 to 10.2 per cent by 1970 (NZPC 1979: 78) – which is highly unusual compared to 
escalating expenditure figures in other western countries at the time. The spending pat-
tern also seems to reflect the lack of new initiatives during the 1950s and 1960s already 
noted. Despite being a pioneer of the welfare state and praised by left-wing politicians 
an social reformers around the world in the 1940s, by the 1970s, New Zealand had ap-
parently become an ungenerous welfare state ‘laggard’. This conclusion, however, is 
only correct with regards to the formal welfare state programmes. Once we look beyond 
direct cash transfers and social services and towards the overall level of welfare ensured 
through state intervention, the ‘laggard’ label fails to capture the real extent of social 
protection in New Zealand. 
Francis G. Castles has argued that during much of the post-war era both Australia 
and New Zealand provided ‘social security’ in a wider sense not only through direct 
income transfers but also ‘by other means’ (Castles 1985, 1989). Two sets of conditions 
account for this pattern. On the one hand, favourable economic and demographic cir-
cumstances, such as a high degree of economic development, male full employment, 
high home ownership rates and a rather ‘young’ demographic profile kept demand for 
social expenditure relatively low. On the other hand, policy ‘supply’ tended to focus on 
trade protectionism and a highly regulated system of wage setting via industrial con-
ciliation and arbitration (Mabbett 1995). This policy of ‘domestic defense’ (Castles 
1989) allowed employers to pay relatively high and equal wages, set at a level sufficient 
for the male breadwinner to support a wife and family. According to Castles, the so-
called family wage worked in combination with full employment as a functional equiva-
lent to a more generous welfare state, thus earning the New Zealand its laggard label in 
terms of social expenditure growth during the post-war years. Therefore, Castles la-
belled Australia and New Zealand, somewhat more appropriately, as ‘wage earners’ 
welfare states’ (1985).  
                                                 
3  An earmarked Social Security Tax existed until 1968 when it was amalgamated with the existing income tax.  
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3.  FOUR PERIODS OF CHANGE 
3.1 1975-1984: Crisis? What Crisis? 
In the 1970s, New Zealand’s system of production and protection came under heavy 
strain, mainly due to shifts in the world economy and various social changes such as 
rising female labour participation and family change (Castles 1996). A sharp slump in 
wool prices in 1966/67 foreshadowed the kind of problems inherent in social protection 
provided through the wages system. The main problem was that New Zealand’s earlier 
economic success had been to a large extent based on the agricultural sector’s interna-
tional competitiveness. Put simply, export incomes from this sector had been used to 
finance a manufacturing sector that developed under an umbrella provided by tariffs and 
import licensing (Jones 1999). The result resembled the ‘import substitution industriali-
sation’ strategy of Latin America and East Asia (Schwartz 2000). But for a small econ-
omy like New Zealand this policy of cross-subsidisation had led to a high dependence 
on overseas markets and movements in commodity terms of trade, despite some export 
diversification. After a last boom between 1970 and 1973, terms of trade collapsed, an 
event which can be seen as the ‘beginning of the end’. Two further blows make the 
story complete: In 1973, Britain, New Zealand’s most important market for pastoral 
products, entered the European Economic Community (now the EU) and New Zealand 
suddenly had to cope with competition from heavily subsidised European countries on 
the British market. At the same time, the first oil shock led to rising import prices. This 
put even more pressure on the economy, at a time when pastoral exports could already 
no longer provide enough foreign exchange to finance the protected sectors. 
Table 1: Economic and Fiscal Performance, 1976-2000, Five-year Averages 
  1976 
- 
1980 
1981 
- 
1985 
1986 
- 
1990 
1991 
- 
1995 
1996 
- 
2000 
Real Economic Growth Rate -0.5 1.3 -0.2 2.2 0.9 
Unemployment Rate 1.1 4.3 5.1 9.2 6.7 
Consumer Price Inflation Rate 14.9 12.1 10.2 2.3 1.3 
Fiscal Surplus in % of GDP -1.3 -4.8 -2.1 -0.6 2.2 
Net Public Debt in % GDP 11.2 27.5 44.4 45.8 24.4 
Current Account Surplus in % GDP -5.1 -5.8 -4.5 -3.8 -5.6 
Source: Data are mostly official data and are taken from Dalziel/Lattimore 2004. For exact sources and definitions 
see Dalziel/Lattimore 2004. Economic growth rates calculated on the basis of Maddison’s (2003) data.  
From 1974, the economy virtually stagnated and then slid into recession in 1977/78, 
before recovering again slowly in the early 1980s (see table 1 for an overview of New 
Zealand’s economic performance). From about 1977, unemployment began to rise 
which came as a shock to a country with an outstanding record of virtual full employ-
ment throughout the post-war years (see figure 1). As in many other OECD-nations, 
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consumer price inflation rose sharply after 1973 but soon reached above the OECD-
average where it stayed until the beginning of the 1990s. Public finances reflected the 
adverse economic conditions: A small financial surplus of the public accounts in 1977 
and 1978 was rapidly eaten up and deficits of up to 6.4 per cent of GDP were to follow 
until the mid-1990s. 
The National Party came into office in 1975 and Prime Minister Robert Muldoon 
soon began to tackle the economic problems with a mixture of cautious liberalisation 
and traditional state intervention. Particularly during the early 1980s, and despite calls 
for further liberalisation coming from his own party and officials at the Treasury and the 
Reserve Bank, Muldoon refused to introduce big changes à la Margaret Thatcher in 
Britain. Instead, he imposed a wage and price freeze in 1982 and set up ‘Think Big’, a 
package of large-scale public investment projects, particularly in the energy sector. 
Ironically, New Zealand’s Westminster-style system of government, which gave later 
governments the opportunity to push through sweeping policy changes, helped the late 
Muldoon block liberalisation. New Zealand before 1993 was one of the clearest exam-
ples of a ‘majoritarian democracy’ (Lijphart 1999) where power is concentrated in (usu-
ally a single-party majority) cabinet and not divided between federal and regional lev-
els, strong parliamentary chambers etc. Muldoon took this concentration of power to the 
extreme by occupying both the Prime Minister’s and the Minister of Finance’s position 
during his time in office between 1975 and 1984. 
Figure 1: Unemployment, 1961-2003 
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Under Muldoon, a number of social policy reforms were enacted (see table 3 in the an-
nex for an overview). Yet, despite the pressure coming from rising fiscal deficits and 
unemployment, Muldoon’s overall record is one of welfare state expansion rather than 
of retrenchment. There were a number of cost containment measures but, without ques-
tion, the most significant reform was the introduction of National Superannuation, a 
universal and generous system of flat-rate, non-contributory pensions.  
In 1974, the previous Labour government had legislated for New Zealand Superan-
nuation, a contributory funded scheme with earnings-related benefits which was sup-
posed to fully replace universal Superannuation after a phase-in period of at least 40 
years (Collins 1977). This gave National the opportunity to campaign for a simpler 
scheme with a comprehensive universal flat-rate pension called National Superannua-
tion to be paid directly out of general revenue and, more importantly, immediately from 
the time of enactment. National’s proposal also appealed to women who were still 
largely excluded from full-time work and would have been losers under Labour’s con-
tributory plan (McClure 1998: 190-196). 
With this platform, famously called “the biggest election bribe in the country’s his-
tory” by historian Keith Sinclair (1991: 316), the conservatives won the 1975 general 
election and in 1976 National Superannuation replaced both the existing dual pension 
structure established in 1938 as well as Labour’s short-lived social insurance scheme of 
1974. National Superannuation was paid from 1978 to all New Zealanders above age 60 
at a generous level of (combined) 80 per cent of gross average ordinary weekly wages 
for a married couple and 48 per cent for a single person (Booth 1977: 116).  
Due to its generous character and the low eligibility age, the cost for National Super-
annuation began to rise quickly. Officials at the Treasury and the Department of Social 
welfare were highly critical of the new scheme (McClure 1998: 194). Between 1975 and 
1984, the number of pensioners rose by over 55 per cent and within the first four years 
of the National government, net expenditure on the aged increased from 3.6 per cent to 
5.7 per cent of GDP (NZPC 1979: 78). In an attempt to curb the burgeoning cost of su-
perannuation, the calculation base for benefits was reduced from gross to net average 
wage levels in 1979, a decision that can be seen as the starting point of the retrenchment 
period in social policy in New Zealand.  
Yet, retrenchment was only partial and was introduced alongside more expansionary 
measures as, for instance, in family policy. The universal Family Benefit, introduced 
after World War II and since that time the main instrument in family policy, had been 
neglected by politicians. As it was not indexed, the benefit’s real value eroded markedly 
over the years, from about eight per cent of average wages in 1946 to around 3 per cent 
by 1983 (St John 2001: 3). The development of social security spending on children 
reflects this trend: It declined from 2.7 per cent of GDP in 1950 to just under one per 
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cent in 1979 (NZPC 1979: 78). However, the changes in Superannuation indexation in 
1979 released resources of $114 million that were used to double the Family Benefit to 
$6 weekly, which represented the last ever increase of this benefit before its abolition in 
1991 (McClure 1998: 200). Yet, this benefit increase – although significant as an im-
mediate cash injection for families –was again quickly eaten up by inflation due to the 
government’s refusal to give way to calls for the indexation of the Family Benefit. 
Modifying the existing system of provision, a new strategy of needs-based assistance 
was introduced, initially in the form of tax rebates such as the Young Family Rebate in 
1976 (Koopman-Boyden/Scott 1984: 144-150).4 In contrast to the Family Benefit, how-
ever, the tax rebates were insensitive to the number of children in the household and did 
not reach families without significant taxable income. In short, they were a rather blunt 
instrument for targeting assistance to the needy. It was not until Labour took office in 
1984 that a clearer needs-based policy towards families emerged. 
Most measures in other areas of the welfare states during the Muldoon years in-
volved incremental, if largely negative, adjustments, such as the reduction in the value 
of the main benefit for lone parents, the Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB), by $16 for 
the first six months, enacted in 1977 after rising DPB beneficiary numbers and public 
concerns about the moral effects of granting a benefit to lone mothers had motivated the 
government to set up a DPB Review Committee (Easton 1981: 91-94). In 1979, eligibil-
ity for the accommodation benefit was limited and unemployment benefit recipients 
without children had to face a significant reduction in their benefits in the 1979 budget, 
whereas most other payments remained relatively stable in real terms over the period 
1975-1984 (Stephens 1992: 104). 
In health care, some pressure for change began to build up in the 1970s (Gauld 2001: 
31-38) and the government started what in the long run turned out to be a process of 
decentralisation of provision. In order to devolve some responsibility for the manage-
ment of secondary and tertiary care, the Area Health Boards Act 1983 allowed for the 
establishment of regionally based and elected area health boards (AHBs), the majority 
of which was set up only after 1984, under the subsequent Labour government. In acci-
dent compensation, some changes were introduced in 1982, with a reduction in earn-
ings-related compensation levels but increased maximum lump sums for some types of 
damages. 
                                                 
4  The Young Family Rebate amounted to up to $9 per week for families with at least one dependent child under 
five years and replaced existing tax exemptions that had been unfavourable for low-income families. Several 
similar rebates were added over the following years and some were merged again into new types of rebates, re-
sulting in a highly complex structure (cf. Nolan 2002). 
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On the whole, instead of drastic cutbacks as a response to economic crisis the period 
between 1975 and 1984 was marked, at first, by a dramatic expansion of state involve-
ment and then – in part precisely because of this expansion – by stagnation as well as 
some retrenchment from 1979 onwards.  
In the early 1980s, Muldoon’s mixture of interventionist policies and cautious eco-
nomic liberalisation had become increasingly unpopular. Even among National Party 
members, support was crumbling. Within National and Labour, monetarist ideas began 
to spread and new movements – such as the free-market New Zealand Party (NZP) – 
emerged. In June 1984, in the midst of a turbulent financial crisis, Prime Minister Mul-
doon called a snap election and lost it. At first, the change in government did not im-
prove the state of the economy but even deepened the crisis: Financial markets expected 
a Labour victory and a depreciation of the New Zealand Dollar, forcing the Reserve 
Bank to suspend all foreign exchange dealings. The incoming government depreciated 
the dollar by 20 per cent as expected, even before having been sworn in by the Gover-
nor-General. This was but the first step in what might be the most rapid and radical eco-
nomic reforms an OECD-country has seen in recent years.  
3.2 1984-1990: More Market – Less Social Welfare? 
The history of the economic liberalisation policies known as ‘Rogernomics’ after Minis-
ter of Finance Roger Douglas has been told in great detail (e.g. Easton 1989a, 1997; 
Dalziel/Lattimore 2004; Quiggin 1998; Silverstone et al. 1996). Some elements were 
the floating of the exchange rate and comprehensive deregulation of financial markets, 
the creation of an independent central bank, radical tax reforms5, the reduction of tariffs 
and other trade barriers, the abolition of subsidies in agriculture and – albeit somewhat 
more slowly – in the manufacturing sector, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and 
restructuring of the state sector in general. It was not just the extent but also the speed of 
change that impressed (or worried) New Zealanders and foreign observers. In any case, 
Rogernomics provided both admirers and critics of free-market reforms with a new 
benchmark – probably an even better one than ‘Thatcherism’, taking place at about the 
same time in Britain. Yet, the question of whether the reforms have been an overall suc-
cess or failure is still open to debate (Dalziel 2002; Evans et al. 1996). 
The sharp policy reversal towards ‘more market’ in economic policy in 1984 has 
been explained by the crisis situation the newly elected government found itself in, 
combined with the considerable leeway given to crucial actors within the government 
                                                 
5  The 1980s saw a strong shift in New Zealand’s tax mix away from direct taxation and towards much stronger 
reliance on indirect taxes, namely through the new Goods and Services Tax (Dalsgaard  2001: 42). Changes in the 
income tax structure – flattening the scale and broadening the base – were equally radical by international stan-
dards (Ganghof 2001). 
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(Debnam 1990)6. With the help of monetarist economists at the Treasury, Roger Doug-
las and his supporters in cabinet and parliament could push through economic policy 
proposals at great speed in cabinet committees, often at very short notice and unchecked 
by a president, a second chamber, a constitutional court or other potential veto players 
(Tsebelis 2002).  
Against the backdrop of radical economic restructuring, expectations were high that 
social policy would suffer a similar fate:  
“In the context of such a comprehensive overhaul of all aspects of the New Zealand 
economy, it was inevitable that the social security system would also come in for atten-
tion. Moreover, given that the wider reforms had largely focussed on questions of effi-
ciency, it was also inevitable that the changes would be largely concerned with the effi-
cient targeting of social security expenditure” (Mackay 2001: 9).   
This need for reform was expressed quite clearly by bureaucrats. Indeed, Economic 
Management and Government Management, the Treasury briefing papers that are some-
times seen as the blueprint for New Zealand’s reforms (NZ Treasury 1984, 1987), con-
tain a number of recommendations which aim at stronger targeting of benefits and re-
duction of government involvement in the provision of social services. The universal 
elements of the New Zealand welfare state, e.g. National Superannuation and the Fam-
ily Benefit, came under particularly critical scrutiny from officials and business lobby 
groups such as the influential Business Roundtable. 
The government’s position on welfare state reform was more complex. Labour’s 
election platforms in 1984 and 1987 were relatively vague on this issue, which can be 
seen as a reflection of an unresolved conflict between the different internal factions. To 
the right, the so-called ‘troika’, consisting of Minister of Finance Roger Douglas and his 
junior ministers Richard Prebble and David Caygill, formed the centre of a group of 
Labour MPs in favour of more radical adjustments. To the left, Prime Minister Lange, 
although a defender of economic restructuring, was much more cautious with respect to 
social policy. In the late 1980s, Labour’s more traditional wing – of which Lange was a 
part – actively tried to limit the Treasury’s and Douglas’s influence in social policy mat-
ters. The establishment of a Royal Commission on Social Policy in 1986, with wide-
ranging terms of reference, is often seen in this light:  
“Lange appears to have been trying to construct a fence between those areas – typically 
business – which he considered the proper domain of Rogernomics and those areas 
which would not be subject to the same degree of commercialisation – typically social 
                                                 
6  Geoffrey Debnam regards the 1980s reforms as a good illustration of the ‘adversary politics’ in Westminster 
systems where a two-party competition leads to sharp U-turns triggered by a climate of stress, e.g. an economic 
crisis (1990). 
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policy. The Treasury and the Treasury Ministers objected to such a fence, resisting the 
establishment of a Royal Commission which might attempt to build one” (Easton 
1989b: 174).  
The most prominent social policy reforms under Labour were certainly the legislative 
changes concerning the pensions regime. The government restricted eligibility for Na-
tional Superannuation and future benefit increases were to become more modest in 
scope. The first important decision – for New Zealand one of the most crucial decisions 
in social policy of the last 25 years – was the introduction of the ‘Superannuation tax 
surcharge’, a claw-back tax on pensioners with additional income.7 Under the conditions 
of a budget deficit of 8.7 per cent of GDP, the main motivation was cost containment. 
And superannuation was a likely target: Treasury officials and many politicians ques-
tioned the legitimacy of a relatively generous pension paid to rich and poor alike irre-
spective of other resources. Furthermore, according to OECD data, by 1984 over 40 % 
of public social expenditure (including health) was on old age cash benefits, i.e. Na-
tional Superannuation (OECD 2004a; see figure 3). Therefore, changes in the level of 
the pension for some or all recipients would contribute significantly to a deficit reduc-
tion.  
Shortly after coming into office, Labour introduced the surcharge, thereby ignoring a 
campaign promise not to change superannuation (McClure 1998: 214). Although tech-
nically the surcharge was merely a tax on additional income of superannuitants – on top 
of the regular income tax – the effect was similar to an income-test: Above a fixed 
threshold, additional income was taxed with an added 25 per cent up to the exact 
amount of the pension. Thus, in the first year, about 10 per cent of all pensioners lost 
their pension entirely, another 13 per cent had to pay back some of it in taxes. Even 
though the vast majority of pensioners remained unaffected, the surcharge became – and 
remained – one of the most unpopular social policy changes of the whole period since 
1975. One reason was the uncertainty surrounding the surcharge, with frequent adjust-
ment of the rate and basic allowance according to the budget situation governments 
were facing (see PRG 1997 for details). 
The overall pension level relative to wages was not reduced during Labour’s first 
term; on the contrary, it was considerably lifted, even above the initial 80 per cent level 
(Preston 2001). By 1987, the government restored the 80 per cent ratio which remained 
until 1989 when the Finance Act 1989 introduced a new indexation mechanism: Super-
annuation was to increase in line with either wages or prices, whichever was growing 
                                                 
7  New Zealand was not the only country with a universal pension scheme to opt for a ‘claw back’: “Since the early 
1980s, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden have all adopted some form of selective 
targeting to reduce formerly universal flat-rate benefits for high-income seniors” (Myles/Pierson 2001: 321). 
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slower, but within a band of 65 to 72.5 per cent of average earnings. Wage relativity 
was thus not completely abolished. As a result, even without nominal cuts, the level 
shifted downward at considerable speed during the early 1990s to just 69.6 per cent of 
average earnings by 1992 (Preston 2001). Further wide-ranging reforms such as a long-
term rise in the eligibility age were announced by Labour in 1990, only months before 
the general election, but never implemented.  
With regard to private and occupational pensions, New Zealand has been remarkable 
in that it removed all tax subsidies for these schemes in the late 1980s as part of the 
general tax reforms. A neutral tax treatment now applies for private retirement savings 
relative to other types of savings – except for home ownership – which is highly un-
usual in comparison to other OECD-countries (Yoo/Serres 2004). However, private 
provision for retirement has traditionally been weak in New Zealand. In the late 1980s, 
only about 15 per cent of those over 60 years had a private pension – mostly from occu-
pational schemes – and many of the pensions were rather small (St John 1992: 130). 
In family policy, Labour tried a novel approach and diverged even further from the 
traditional universal design than National did between 1975 to 1984. Starting off with 
Family Care, a wage supplement available for low-income family on a per-child basis in 
addition to the Family Benefit, the government attempted to target assistance more ef-
fectively. Only ‘working families’ with paid work of at least 30 hours weekly per 
household were eligible. However, take-up rates were very low (McClure 1998: 216), a 
pattern which repeated itself with the Guaranteed Minimum Family Income (GMFI), 
introduced two years later. Family policy under Labour was not aimed solely at working 
families. In 1986, together with GMFI, the government launched Family Support, a tax 
rebate to low-income families, which was to become the main family cash transfer over 
the years.8 This shift towards means-tested benefits was intensified by the non-
adjustment of the universal Family Benefit during times of high consumer price infla-
tion. By 1991, it was worth less than 1 per cent of average wages (St John 2001: 3). 
However, the newly introduced Family Support was not inflation-proof, either. Conse-
quently, its real value declined markedly during the late 1980s and up to the mid-1990s 
(St John 2004: 7). 
For other programmes such as the Unemployment Benefit the Labour government 
maintained the restrictive stance of its predecessors and tightened eligibility even fur-
ther. A range of subsidised employment schemes of the 1970s and early 1980s were 
scrapped in 1985 on grounds of possible market distorting effects and replaced by 
ACCESS, a training scheme, in 1987 (Higgings 1999: 262-263). In accident compensa-
                                                 
8  Family Support replaced Family Care as well as the family tax rebates introduced under National, i.e. the Family 
Rebate, the Principal Income Earner Rebate and the Family Maintenance Allowance (Nolan 2002: 3). 
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tion, when faced with shrinking reserves in 1987, the government raised levies by over 
300 per cent but left entitlements untouched (St John 1999a: 159). In health care and 
housing policy, Labour received a number of wide-ranging policy recommendations but 
in the end resisted major changes.  
In sum, Labour did introduce social policy reforms, though far less radically than in 
the economic field. Most of the changes during their two terms in office aimed at re-
trenchment but not across-the-board retrenchment. The programme most affected was 
National Superannuation, the most generous – and therefore most expensive – universal 
scheme. The surcharge effectively led to means-testing the pension which can be seen 
as a watershed in New Zealand’s recent history. In family policy, Labour also shifted 
towards needs-based policies. Most of the other programmes, however, remained 
largely unaffected. With hindsight, Francis G. Castles and Ian Shirley see the Labour 
government “not so much as the executioner of New Zealand’s welfare state, but rather 
as its gravedigger”, paving the way for more radical retrenchment by subsequent con-
servative administrations (Castles/Shirley 1996: 89). Without the ensuing 1990s cuts, 
their verdict would probably have been less pessimistic. 
After Labour’s re-election in 1987, internal tensions had intensified and finally con-
flicts over personal and policy issues led to David Lange’s resignation in August 1989. 
His successor Geoffrey Palmer also resigned after just over one year in office and was 
followed by Mike Moore who led the government during the two-month transition pe-
riod until Labour’s crushing defeat in the 1990 general election. National won the elec-
tion largely on the basis of voters’ disillusionment with Labour, a disillusionment that 
had been visible for some time (Vowles/Aimer 1993: 3). What was to follow were nine 
years of conservative rule with important consequences for the welfare state. 
3.3 1990-1999: Conservative Retrenchment and Restructuring 
The 1990s, the first half of the decade in particular, can be seen as “the most radical 
reshaping of the welfare state in New Zealand since the Great Depression” (Boston 
1992a: 15-16). In a relatively short period of time, the conservative government intro-
duced significant changes in two respects. First and foremost, social welfare entitle-
ments were changed in structure and level with the stated aim of converting the welfare 
state into a ‘modest safety net’ for the needy (Minister of Social Welfare Jenny Shipley 
as cited in Boston 1992a: 1). Secondly, the ways in which benefits and services were 
provided were considerably transformed in many fields, in line with theoretical models 
promising large efficiency gains. As in the preceding sections, I will focus on the first 
aspect, that is, changes on the benefit side and give only a brief overview about changes 
in the structural framework of provision. 
National’s radicalism in social welfare policy after taking office surprised many vot-
ers as their election programme had been rather vague about their position on the wel-
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fare state, with a promise to scrap the hated pension surtax and to keep spending in 
health care at the same level. However, senior members of the party – among them the 
incoming Minister of Finance Ruth Richardson – already pushed for a sweeping reform 
of the welfare state (Boston 1992a: 6). 
In economic policy, National largely continued what Labour had started in the 1980s, 
with one major extension. In 1991, the Employment Contracts Act effectively disman-
tled the traditional system of wage setting which, under Labour, had seen only minor 
reforms. National opted for a highly decentralised system instead, based on individual 
employment contracts (Bray/Walsh 1998; Harbridge 1993).  
Just like Labour in 1984, the National government had come into office in the midst 
of a renewed crisis. Unemployment was still rising and around the time of the change in 
office, the fiscal outlook had worsened considerably. Compared to the fiscal forecast on 
which Labour’s last budget in 1990 was based, the revised figures of the Treasury’s 
Briefing to the Incoming Government of July 1990 were much more pessimistic, with 
projected budget deficits of 4.8 per cent of GDP for the financial year 1991/92, rising to 
5.7 and 6.3 per cent in the following years respectively (NZ Treasury 1990: 64; see Dal-
ziel 1992). Politically, the fiscal crisis provided National government with a powerful 
justification for the benefit cuts introduced in 1991. 
The two most important events in this respect were the announcement in December 
1990, only weeks after the change in government, of an Economic and Social Initiative 
and the presentation of the ‘mother of all budgets’ in July 1991. Both initiatives in-
cluded massive benefit cuts intended to reduce social welfare expenditure by NZ$ 1.275 
billion or 1.7 per cent of GDP in the first year (Dalziel/Lattimore 2004: 77). These 
measures were justified by Minister of Finance Ruth Richardson and Minister of Social 
Welfare Jenny Shipley on grounds of a fiscal crisis and unfavourable work incentives as 
well as with reference to principles of equity – for instance, when criticising the fact that 
up to now, too many transfers went not just to the poor but to large parts of the middle 
class. Political scientist Jonathan Boston points out, however, that the resulting cuts 
were not very much in line with National’s stated philosophy, as universal benefits such 
as health care and education remained largely unscathed whereas programmes which 
were already highly targeted to the poor were attacked most thoroughly (Boston 1992b: 
94-97; Waldegrave/Frater 1991).  
The benefit cuts announced in December 1990 and July 1991 affected most working-
age benefits such as the Sickness and Unemployment Benefit, Training Benefit and the 
Domestic Purposes Benefit.9 Nominal benefit levels were cut by up to NZ$ 35.40 a 
                                                 
9  The only nominal increase in the package concerned the Invalids’ Benefit for married couples with children 
(Waldegrave/Frater 1991: 77, Table B.6). 
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week, i.e. up to 24.7 per cent of the initial level. The categories most affected included 
single young unemployed and single parents with one child (10.7 per cent reduction) 
(Stephens 1992; Waldegrave/Frater 1991: 77, Table B.6). In real terms, the cuts were 
even more drastic and even beneficiaries without nominal reductions experienced a de-
cline in living standards because the regular inflation adjustments due in April 1991 
were cancelled (see section 4 below). 
Some benefits were completely restructured including family transfers which became 
fully means-tested for the first time since 1946. For low-income families, the value of 
the Family Benefit was added to existing Family Support payments, whereas higher-
income families lost eligibility altogether. One theme of the benefit cuts was to shift 
responsibility back to the family: Payments for 20-24 year olds were reduced to youth 
rates and the eligibility age for the DPB for single parents and for unemployment bene-
fits was raised from 16 to 18 years. Several retrenchment measures affected stand-down 
periods, eligibility rules and abatement rates for additional income (Stephens 1992: 109-
110; Waldegrave/Frater 1991: 8-11). Furthermore, instead of automatic adjustments in 
line with inflation, benefits are now adjusted annually on a discretionary basis (St. John 
and Rankin 2002: 13). 
For housing assistance, the early 1990s mark a turning point (see below for changes 
in the forms of provision). National phased out income-related rents for state houses and 
at the same time introduced a new Accommodation Supplement, an income and asset-
tested cash transfer to help pay the – now significantly higher – market rents (Thorns 
2000). In practice, however, the Supplement did not make up for the rent increases. As a 
result, the government subsidised a smaller share of a household’s rent expenditure 
which, combined with the benefit cuts, hit many poor families extremely hard. People 
already in the private rental market who had hitherto received the Accommodation 
Benefit were made eligible for the Accommodation Supplement, too.  
In terms of the distributional effects of the 1990/91 benefit cuts, Charles Waldegrave 
and Paul Frater calculated that both the absolute and relative impact was significantly 
higher for low-income families with children than for families fewer or no children 
and/or higher household incomes. Contrary to National’s claim of greater targeting to-
ward the really needy, they concluded that these policies must be viewed as “a strategy 
we associate with King John and the Sheriff of Nottingham” (1991: 59). 
National attempted tighter targeting in health care, also. Primary care subsidies were 
reduced for higher income categories and increased for low-income earners and the 
chronically ill. New user charges for hospital visits, however, proved damaging in terms 
of public opinion and had to be abolished after only 13 months (Ashton 1999).  
Accident Compensation, New Zealand’s only public social insurance scheme, also 
came under attack from National. The 1992 Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 
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Insurance Act considerably shifted the cost for accident insurance from employers back 
to workers. Among other things, the range of accidents covered by the employer-
financed part of ACC was narrowed and the benefits available were reduced (St John 
1999a: 162-165). 
During the 1990 general election campaign, National had promised to abolish the 
unpopular superannuation surcharge. After a turbulent period of failed attempts to reach 
a multi-party agreement (St John 1992) and a first radical proposal on superannuation 
that was condemned by pensioner organisations such as Grey Power and Age Concern 
as well as by opposition parties and large parts of the public, National finally presented 
a plan that maintained the means test via the surcharge inherited from the Labour gov-
ernment. The government even increased the rate of the surcharge from 20 to 25 per 
cent and lowered the tax exemption threshold. The eligibility age was to increase step-
by-step to 65 by 2001, starting in 1992. Pension indexation was suspended for two years 
and from 1993, the level was to rise in line with prices without being propped up by the 
‘floor’ of 65 per cent of average wages Labour had introduced in 1989. 
These reforms were highly unpopular, especially within National’s own constituency 
of support. In the run-up to the 1993 general election, in order to respond to voters’ 
concerns, National, Labour, and the Alliance – a merger of several left-wing parties – 
tried to secure the pension status quo. The aim was to avoid another election battle 
around this highly sensitive issue. The signatories of the ‘Multi-Party Accord on Super-
annuation’ pledged to retain a pension at age 65 (from 2001), indexed to the Consumer 
Price Index within a wage band of 65 to 72.5 per cent (couple rate) of average wages10. 
The surcharge on high-income pensioners – which by now affected over 30 per cent of 
superannuitants – should stay. Yet, the Accord’s effectiveness was weakened by the 
refusal of the populist New Zealand First (NZF) party to add their signature. This short-
coming proved to be fatal in the 1996 election campaign, when NZF, followed by all 
Accord parties except National, called for the return to a more generous pension scheme 
(St John 1999b: 184-288). Just before the election, even National had to give in and 
eased the effects of the surcharge by increasing the income exemption threshold mark-
edly. 
Apart from benefit retrenchment and tightening of eligibility rules, the National gov-
ernment introduced sweeping changes to the structure of provision of benefits and so-
cial services. These changes were part of an overall re-organisation of the public sector 
and the state apparatus, starting already under Labour (cf. Boston et al. 1991). Due to 
                                                 
10  In 1998, the short-lived National minority government under Jenny Shipley’s premiership, lowered the wage 
floor from 65 to 60 per cent of average wages. This change, however, was reversed by Labour in 2000. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 22) 
- 18 - 
their role as social services the organisational changes in health care, accident compen-
sation and the housing sector proved to be particularly important in political terms.  
In 1993, the conservative government sought to radically reform health care institu-
tions by introducing a ‘purchaser-provider split’, thereby hoping to increase the sys-
tem’s efficiency. Four Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) replaced the elected health 
boards and were to act as the main purchasing organisations, each with a single budget 
to buy primary and secondary health services and disability support on behalf of the 
population – three areas until then separately financed. In terms of the interface with 
patients, the change was just as radical: The government regrouped public hospitals and 
community services into 23 profit-oriented Crown Health Enterprises and made them 
compete with private hospitals, general practitioners (GPs) and voluntary organisations 
in an internal market for contracts with the RHAs (Ashton 1999). A number of further 
organisational changes – such as the creation of a new Public Health Commission – 
were part of the package, although some of them were never implemented (Easton 
1994; Gauld 2001). 
Housing policy saw a similar shift (Thorns 2000). The Housing Corporation, estab-
lished in 1974 to manage the public housing stock and provide mortgage financing, was 
restructured: The housing stock was transferred to Housing New Zealand Ltd. (HNZ), a 
state-owned enterprise, while the mortgage business was privatised. HNZ was required 
to introduce market-rents and operate along commercial lines. When seen in conjunc-
tion with the introduction of the Accommodation Supplement, the basic rationale for 
National’s housing reforms becomes clear: “The reforms were designed to remove the 
state from its traditional role in the housing market as a provider of accommodation and 
finance, and to replace this system with a policy regime that purported to empower con-
sumers to meet their own housing needs via income support” (Murphy 1999: 218).  
The most recent shift towards a market-based model of provision occurred in acci-
dent compensation. From 1999, private providers were allowed to enter the market for 
insurance cover of work-related personal injury. Hitherto, the Accident Compensation 
Commission (ACC) had been the publicly owned monopoly provider (see section 2). 
Now employers were to choose a (private or public) company to insure their employees. 
The government did not, however, abolish mandatory work accident insurance alto-
gether. This part-privatisation of provision was reversed by the incoming Labour-led 
government as early as 2000. 
With respect to public opinion, National’s early retrenchment policies and the broken 
superannuation surcharge promises proved damaging. Public support for the Bolger 
government plunged to just over 20 per cent by late September 1991, about one year 
after the election (Boston/Dalziel 1992: x). Disenchantment with National was part of a 
wider dissatisfaction with the political process, ultimately leading to major changes in 
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the electoral system. When asked whether to change the electoral system in two refer-
enda in 1992 and 1993, a large majority of New Zealanders voted in favour of replacing 
the single-member plurality (or ‘First-Past-the-Post’) electoral system with proportional 
representation. Interestingly, this constitutional reform was triggered ‘by accident’ dur-
ing the 1987 general election campaign, when Labour Prime Minister David Lange un-
intentionally promised to hold a binding referendum on this issue – instead of a merely 
indicative one, as he intended. After Labour failed to deliver following its re-election in 
1987, the conservative opposition tried to capitalise on this broken promise three years 
later and pledged to hold a binding referendum after a change in office. National won 
the election and, in 1992 and 1993, two referenda were held – one indicative referen-
dum and eventually a binding vote. Ironically, in a unique conjunction between the dy-
namics of party competition, voter dissatisfaction and historical accidents, the two par-
ties that benefited most from the old electoral system gave way to abolishing it. Many 
(e.g. Mulgan 1995) argue that New Zealanders changed their electoral system because 
they had become increasingly critical about the way governments could push through 
reforms at great speed and without much external consultation. During the post-war 
years, and largely due to the electoral system, governments in New Zealand were at all 
times supported by a single-party majority in parliament. Still, no single government 
between 1954 and 1993 was elected with more than a plurality of the popular vote. This 
is why political scientist Jack Nagel has termed the pure Westminster system ‘plurali-
tarian’ (Nagel 2000) instead of just ‘majoritarian’ (Lijphart 1999). In 1992 and 1993, a 
large majority of New Zealanders voted for a change, with the hope that future govern-
ments would reflect a bigger share of the electorate.11  
Despite its low popularity, the National government survived the 1993 general elec-
tion – the last one under the old plurality system – and it survived the following election 
in 1996. Even so, the government’s position had weakened significantly. In 1993 Na-
tional gained only a razor-thin majority in the House of Representatives – which it soon 
lost as a consequence of defections from dissatisfied National MPs – and in 1996 it fell 
short of a single-party majority altogether. After lengthy negotiations, National and 
New Zealand First formed a coalition government. 
The period between 1996 and 1999 – with National now governing in coalition with 
New Zealand First12 – was characterised less by radical retrenchment than by cautious 
policymaking and even a number of significant reversals. Health policy – one of the key 
                                                 
11  There is evidence that this might not be the sole reason for change, and that dissatisfaction with the current gov-
ernment’s policies was another decisive factor (Levine/Roberts 1993, 1994; Denemark 2001).  
12  The coalition broke apart in August 1998, and National stayed in office as a minority government under the pre-
miership of Jenny Shipley until 1999. 
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issues in the 1993 and 1996 general elections – is a case in point. The 1993 health re-
forms were widely regarded as a fiasco. Survey evidence of 1994 (Laugesen 2001: 136; 
cf. Donelan et al. 1999) shows that only around 10 per cent of respondents considered 
them a success against about 73 per cent calling them a failure.13 Even 59 per cent of 
National voters thought so. But it was not only public opinion and the electoral outlook 
that worried politicians. It turned out that the new system did not produce the efficiency 
gains reformers had hoped for – in some areas it even performed much worse than the 
old system. As a result, the coalition watered down the quasi-market structure as early 
as 1997. The most important changes in this respect were the merger of the four RHAs 
into one single purchasing organisation, the Health Funding Authority (HFA), increased 
funding, and the abolition of the profit-orientation National had imposed on public pro-
viders in 1993 (Ashton 1999). Moreover, GP services and pharmaceuticals were made 
free of charge for children under six. 
A second big reversal occurred in the field of pensions. From the outset, New Zea-
land First had campaigned against cuts in Superannuation in general and the surcharge 
in particular. Winston Peters, NZF’s charismatic leader, refused to sign the Accord on 
retirement policies in 1993 and actively called for the abolition of the surcharge during 
the 1996 election campaign. As a result, his party received great support from pension-
ers, wealthy ones in particular. The 1996 coalition agreement with National included 
two features in pension policy that were central to New Zealand First. On the one hand, 
the surcharge, dubbed “the single most significant cause of political instability and pub-
lic rancour” since 1985 (St John 1999b: 283), was abolished. On the other hand, there 
would be a proposal for individual compulsory saving for retirement that would be put 
to a referendum. A far-reaching proposal was worked out and eventually rejected in a 
referendum in September 1997 by an overwhelming margin of 91.8 per cent (Preston 
1997).  
One innovation of the 1990s was workfare. Here, New Zealand borrowed heavily 
from other English-speaking countries. From the mid-1990s, the government reinforced 
the workfare or activation approach towards beneficiaries (Higgins 1999). Work-testing 
had been part of social welfare legislation for a long time, but was seldom enforced with 
great vigour. Moreover, it applied only to the unemployed. There were a number of 
small training and active labour market schemes in place, albeit with little overall suc-
cess in bringing the long-term unemployed into private sector employment. New groups 
were made subject to a work test: single parents, spouses or partners of beneficiaries, 
and people with a disability, sickness or injury (Mackay 2003: 104). The amount of 
                                                 
13  Miriam Laugesen, however, noted that “[t]he Government was often blamed for difficulties that were long-
standing features of health care services in New Zealand, such as long waiting times for surgery” (2001: 136). 
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work that was expected from beneficiaries varied according to medical condition and 
the family situation. Furthermore, the new regime would be accompanied by more indi-
vidual case management and some additional child care subsidies. Sanctions should 
ensure that the work tests were effective. Irrespective of its low popularity among bene-
ficiary groups, there are doubts concerning extent to which the sanctions regime was 
actually enforced ‘at the street level’. There were also a number of changes on the bene-
fit side: A new Independent Family Tax Credit (IFTC) for working families and new 
abatement rules for additional income were designed to ‘make work pay’ for beneficiar-
ies (Mackay 2003: 105-106).14 In 1998, the National/NZF coalition merged the unem-
ployment and sickness benefit and – in the spirit of mutual obligation between the wel-
fare administration and the individual beneficiary – renamed it ‘Community Wage’. 
Under the Community Wage framework, beneficiaries who did not find employment 
could also be required to take on community work, e.g. in the voluntary sector. How-
ever, there is no evidence that the Community Wage programme worked very effec-
tively.15 Admittedly, the scheme was not given much time to bear out the expectations. 
In 2000, the incoming Labour government disestablished many – but by no means all – 
of the elements of their predecessors’ workfare policies.  
To sum up, the phase between 1990 and 1999 has seen the most turbulent struggle 
around New Zealand’s welfare state since the 1930s. The Bolger government’s first 
term, in particular, was a period of deep benefit retrenchment in virtually all areas of the 
welfare state. Moreover, driven by ideas about the superiority of market or quasi-market 
structures for benefit provision and service delivery, the health, housing and accident 
compensation sectors were extensively remodelled along these lines. From the mid-
1990s, however, and particularly once National had entered a coalition with New Zea-
land First, the pace of change slowed down appreciably and some reforms were re-
versed, namely in pensions and health care, albeit only partially. 
                                                 
14  The IFTC – later renamed Child Tax Credit (CTC) – is important in that it provides significantly higher assis-
tance than the existing Family Support, i.e. the assistance for families on other benefits (St John 2004: 7). Thus, 
the dual structure of family assistance, originating under Labour during the 1980s but with little real significance 
due to low take-up rates, was strengthened with this reform. In October 1999, the three tax credits available for 
working families only – the CTC, Parental Tax Credit and Family Tax Credit, the former GMFI – were amalga-
mated into the Family Plus package (Nolan 2002). 
15  In 2000, an internal evaluation of the Community Wage scheme carried out by officials under the National Gov-
ernment was made public by Labour. The study found no evidence that beneficiaries under the Community Wage 
scheme were more likely to enter into paid employment than others (“Damning report charts failure of work-for-
the-dole scheme”, Press Statement by Hon Steve Maharey, Minister of Social Welfare, 16 November 2000, 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz). 
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3.4 1999-2004: A Third Way? 
The election of 1999 brought Labour back into power, now under the leadership of 
Helen Clark. The party gained 49 seats in the 120-seat parliament and chose to form a 
minority coalition together with the left-wing Alliance. The coalition was supported by 
the Green Party on confidence matters. In terms of party positions, Labour had moved 
back towards the centre-left during the time on the opposition bench and Helen Clark’s 
campaign was characterised by promises to reverse many of National’s reforms and to 
allow for more state intervention into the economy. The economic situation looked bet-
ter than in 1984 or 1990. New Zealand had weathered the storm of the 1998 Asian crisis 
relatively well; unemployment began to fall again in 1999 and economic growth re-
gained pace. What followed the election were two terms of centre-left rule under Prime 
Minister Helen Clark, first in form of a Labour/Alliance coalition until the Alliance 
broke apart in 2002. Since then, Labour has governed with the Progressive Coalition 
Party, a former Alliance member. At the time of writing, a continuation of a Labour-led 
government of some sort even beyond the 2005 election seems likely.  
In contrast to the National/NZF coalition, social welfare policies under the La-
bour/Alliance and Labour/Progressive coalitions tend to be much more harmonious. The 
policy positions of the coalition partners indeed overlap quite considerably on these 
issues. As to the changes brought to the welfare state since 1999, the first term has 
largely been about reversing the retrenchment and marketisation policies of the 1990s 
whereas the second term brought about a number of fresh expansionary initiatives.16  
Policy reversals occurred, for instance, in Accident Compensation where the Clark 
government restored the state monopoly in provision. With respect to housing, the gov-
ernment reintroduced income-related rents and repealed the profitability requirement for 
state housing. The Accommodation Supplement has been retained as the main instru-
ment of housing assistance in the private sector and was increased in the 2004 budget 
(Murphy 2003).  
A major U-turn took place in health care: The New Zealand Public Health and Dis-
ability Act 2000 established 21 District Health Boards responsible for both funding and 
provision of services in their districts, thus abandoning the purchaser-provider split of 
1993. To a small extent, the private sector is still involved in delivery of public services 
but the reach of the controversial ‘market model’ is now significantly limited (Health 
Reforms 2001 Research Team 2003). With the current system, New Zealand seems to 
have come full circle, as it very much resembles the Area Health Board system legis-
lated for under Muldoon and implemented during the 1980s. Boards are elected – rather 
                                                 
16  One of the measures during Helen Clark’s first term was the partial reconstruction of collective wage bargaining 
with the Employment Relations Act 2000.  
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than centrally appointed – and given the task of achieving a better integration of ser-
vices. A number of health strategies have been set up, e.g. the primary health care strat-
egy (Ministry of Health 2001). The latter aims, among other things, at improving access 
to primary care for poor New Zealanders through a new subsidy regime based on pri-
mary health organisations (PHOs), i.e. associations of general practitioners and other 
primary care providers (Barnett/Barnett 2004).  
The Labour-led coalition reduced some of the work obligations for the sick and for 
lone mothers but pursued the overall activation strategy. Furthermore, the government is 
increasingly trying to move beneficiaries into work through intensive case-management 
combining tight monitoring and a wider range of employment and training opportuni-
ties. To what extent the mix of ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ elements really differs from the re-
gime under National is, however, open to debate, particularly since many of the sanc-
tions criticised by Labour were only seldom used under National. Despite the ‘activa-
tion’ rhetoric and many workfare reforms since the mid-1990s, New Zealand remains a 
rather ‘passive’ welfare state, with an emphasis on cash transfers instead of active la-
bour market policies (OECD 2004b: 319-327). 
As far as pensions are concerned, the government of Helen Clark restored the ‘wage 
floor’ of 65 per cent of average wages for New Zealand Superannuation in 2000, after 
the short-lived National minority government had lowered the floor to 60 per cent in 
1998. Population aging was the motive when, in 2001, the government set up the NZ 
Superannuation Fund to pre-fund part of the future pension expenditure. Like all West-
ern societies, New Zealand’s society is aging, less dramatically though than Continental 
Europe for example (NZ Treasury 2003a). Expenditure on Superannuation is projected 
to rise to just over 8 per cent of GDP (NZ Treasury 2003b), which would still be lower 
than the share countries such as Germany and France are already spending today on old 
age pensions. Without affecting individual pension entitlements, the NZ Superannuation 
Fund aims at smoothing the fiscal effects of this demographic shift. It is expected to 
begin paying out resources during the 2020s and about twenty years later, its payout 
will peak at 29.5 per cent of the projected cost of Superannuation (PRG 2003).  
There is considerable continuity in social assistance and family policy under the cur-
rent centre-left government. Comparative research has shown that in 2001, despite 
much activity around family assistance since the 1970s, New Zealand was still a laggard 
in terms of the value of the child benefit package typically given to low-income families 
(Stephens 2003). The continuing pattern of needs-based assistance with a dual structure 
consisting of basic safety-net type benefits and additional in-work tax-credits is still 
highly visible in the NZ$ 1.1 billion ‘Working for Families’ benefit package announced 
in May 2004. Instead of restoring the 1991 benefit cuts, as called for by beneficiary 
groups, the government opted for a strategy aiming at strengthening incentives to work 
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for low-income families. The provisions of the package are to be phased in over a pe-
riod of three years. The main instrument is the In-Work Payment (IWP), which in fact is 
the renamed and augmented Child Tax Credit, introduced in 1996 under the name of 
Independent Family Tax Credit by National. Apart from yet another change in the bene-
fit name – a very popular practice among New Zealand governments – the IWP again 
draws a line between Family Support and assistance for working families.  
Although ‘Working for Families’ is probably the biggest expansion of the welfare 
state since National Superannuation was introduced in the 1970s, the government has 
been criticised not only by market-liberals but also by pro-welfare state groups. Critics 
such as the Child Poverty Action Group point out that the package discriminates against 
children of beneficiaries (CPAG 2004). On the one hand, ‘Working for Families’ in-
creases Family Support – i.e. the benefit available for all needy families, irrespective of 
employment status – and for the first time introduces automatic inflation adjustment for 
all major family benefits. Yet, on the other hand, critics argue that the package favours 
working families in particular because only working families will be eligible for the 
IWP. The government’s response to these criticisms is that stronger work incentives 
will push more people into paid employment, thus making them eligible for the IWP. In 
the end, even many who at the beginning were on Family Support will be much better 
off (The Dominion Post 15 November 2004).  
The introduction of paid parental leave and the expansion of childcare subsidies also 
reflect the government’s will to make the combination of paid work and family life eas-
ier. Unpaid parental leave had already been introduced in New Zealand in the 1980s and 
only in 2002 did the government finally set up a comprehensive paid parental leave 
scheme which was enhanced further in 2004 to bring the country in line with current 
ILO standards (The Jobs Letter 2004). Childcare has grown significantly over the last 
decades. To a large extent, this trend was driven by increased demand. With about 40 
per cent of all children aged 0-3 attending early childhood education today, the use of 
formal childcare is high by international standards. Although the government supports 
both providers – directly – and parents – through the Child Care Subsidy and the 
OSCAR subsidy (“Out of School Care and Recreation Subsidy”) – fees are still rela-
tively high in most cases (OECD 2004c: ch. 4). As part of ‘Working for Families’, 
childcare subsidy rates are to increase by 10 per cent each in 2005 and 2006 in combina-
tion with higher income thresholds. 
Recent social policy initiatives have been couched in terms of ‘social investment’ 
and equality of opportunity (Ministry of Social Development 2004a), echoing what is 
known as the Third Way of social democracy (cf. Dalziel 2001). The Ministry of Social 
Welfare was renamed Ministry of Social Development, emphasizing the shift from ‘re-
distribution’ to ‘investment’. The government is trying to develop a strategy where so-
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cial policy is perceived as complementing and supporting rather than impeding eco-
nomic development in an ‘inclusive economy’ (NZ Treasury 2001). This can also un-
derstood as an attempt to distinguish current strategies from Labour’s ‘more market’ 
rhetoric of the 1980s. To what extent this shift in rhetoric will lead to a clear shift in 
policy remains to be seen. 
So far, the centre-left government has mostly worked at reversing some of the re-
forms of the 1990s and, with the 2004 ‘Working for Families’ package, even considera-
bly expanded benefits for families. 
Table 2: Overview of Long-term Welfare State Development, 1975-2004 
Policy Area Overall Trend 
Pensions 
Reduced eligibility and generosity within a univer-
sal framework 
Health Policy 
Decentralised organisation, expansion of private 
provision 
Labour Market/Social Assistance 
Reduced basic benefits; workfare and case man-
agement 
Family Policy 
From universal towards purely needs-based assis-
tance, increasingly dual structure with additional in-
work tax credits 
Housing 
From state-provided housing and subsidised financ-
ing towards income support and residual public 
provision 
Accident Compensation 
From a comprehensive social insurance framework 
towards more selective insurance 
4. HOW MUCH CHANGE? 
To what extent has New Zealand’s welfare state been transformed over the last 30 
years? Can we identify a particular pattern of reforms? The historical narrative suggests 
that change has been quite substantial, with an expansion of the state’s role in the mid-
1970s and then, from 1979, retrenchment, starting rather slowly but later – namely un-
der the first Bolger government between 1990 and 1993 – carrying on much more radi-
cally. Table 2 sums up the long-term qualitative trends for the six policy areas examined 
here: pensions, health care, labour market and social assistance policies, family policy, 
housing and accident compensation.17 Common to all areas are a reduction of levels of 
protection and a stronger targeting of benefits. The most radical structural shift took 
place in family assistance with a clear movement away from the traditional universal 
                                                 
17  Note, however, that in some areas, especially in pensions, there have been extreme short-term deviations from 
this long-term trend. In a flip-flop fashion, some changes have been introduced and then reversed. 
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approach towards purely needs-based support. The available aggregate data confirm the 
qualitative results. 
Figure 2: Social Expenditure Development, 1980-2001 
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At the moment, the OECD provides comparative data on public social expenditure be-
tween 1980 and 2001. Figure 2 shows New Zealand’s social expenditure development 
compared to the OECD mean and the mean values of four ‘families of nations’ (Castles 
1998; Obinger/Wagschal 2001). The families of nations should be seen as heuristic 
yardsticks rather than rigid types. A second caveat concerns the expenditure dynamics 
themselves: There is ample evidence that social expenditure is determined to a large 
extent by socio-economic factors, particularly economic growth, the unemployment rate 
and the old age ratio (e.g. Kittel/Obinger 2003). Therefore, an increase or decrease in 
‘welfare effort’, i.e. social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, is not necessarily the 
result of policy changes. This is clearly the case in New Zealand (see figure 1). Rising 
unemployment in the late 1980s can be regarded a crucial factor behind the increase in 
welfare effort. Unemployment peaked at around 1992, and this is when aggregate ex-
penditure began to fall. As we will see, however, this sharp drop in the early 1990s was 
also due to benefit retrenchment. In comparison, New Zealand had a below-average 
expenditure pattern for much of the period between 1980 and 2001. Comparative re-
search has shown a catch-up movement of former welfare state ‘laggards’ in social ex-
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penditure which has taken place over the last decades (Castles 2004; Obinger et al. 
2005). Yet, in New Zealand, twenty years of reforms have held back this upwards trend. 
Social expenditure in 2001 was only at around the 1980 level. 
Figure 3: Structure of Social Expenditure, 1980-2000 
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Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD 2004a).  
This indicates that reformers from the 1990s onwards have been partly successful in 
reducing welfare effort in New Zealand. Figure 3 shows where exactly this reduction 
was most prominent. According to the latest OECD data, the expenditure share going 
into old age and survivors’ pensions has fallen noticeably between 1980 and 2000. In 
1980, three years after the introduction of the costly National Superannuation, it stood at 
more than 40 per cent of total public social expenditure. Twenty years later its share was 
down to just over a quarter of total expenditure. This is highly unusual for a Western 
country. In 21 OECD countries, average expenditure on old age pensions as a share of 
GDP grew from 5.6 per cent in 1980 to 7.9 per cent in 2001. During the same period 
this share actually dropped in New Zealand – from 6.9 per cent to 4.7 per cent of GDP. 
Only Ireland and the Netherlands experienced a similar trend. In the case of New Zea-
land, policy changes account for this development, mainly changes in the pension ad-
justment mechanism and benefit level and, above all, the higher retirement age. For the 
OECD the decision to raise the eligibility age from 60 to 65 is “[b]y far the biggest step 
toward controlling future costs” of the pension (OECD 2002: 67). This is ironic, as for 
much of the period it was not the retirement age but the unpopular superannuation sur-
charge on rich pensioners which caught the public’s attention.  
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Figure 4: Selected Real Benefit Rates, 1981-2004 
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With respect to benefit levels, retrenchment is clearly visible. Figure 4 shows real bene-
fit levels for selected categories over the period 1981 to 2004. Since all benefits are flat-
rate benefits and usually not supplemented by comprehensive public social services, this 
figure provides a relatively accurate picture of the real value of benefits. Still, even 
though benefit levels are a key indicator of retrenchment, they do not reflect the changes 
in eligibility rules that took place in New Zealand. Thus, figure 4 is, if anything, likely 
to understate the real extent of retrenchment. What the figure does clearly show are the 
1991 benefit cuts, a main turning point. Their impact was greatest for unemployed cou-
ples with children, unemployed youths and for lone parents. 
Taking the qualitative and quantitative results together, we can conclude that, far 
from being ‘resilient’, the New Zealand welfare state has been scaled down to a consid-
erable extent. Of course, it has not been completely dismantled. New Zealanders are still 
protected against the same range of risks as most people in other Western countries are. 
Some, such as low-income working families, will even benefit from higher assistance 
from 2005 onwards. In terms of its structural characteristics, the welfare state is still a 
mix of needs-based and citizenship-based programmes. Pensions and health care are 
still essentially universal schemes, and – with the longstanding but minor exception of 
accident compensation – social insurance-based policies are non-existent. Means-testing 
is now even more important than in 1975. Family policy has seen an outright shift in 
principle, from universal benefits towards means-tested assistance. This means that the 
‘liberal’ elements in New Zealand’s welfare regime have been strengthened, including 
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the ‘liberal’ characteristics in terms of social outcomes. Writing in the mid-1990s, 
economist Robert Stephens concluded: “The welfare state in New Zealand has been 
reformed and would certainly now be called a residual, or liberal model. This is not just 
based on entitlement rules for benefits, or input expenditures, but also on the outcomes 
of poverty and inequality in income, educational attainment and health status” 
(Stephens 1996: 490). 
Now, how about ‘social protection by other means’? Does New Zealand still com-
plement its liberal system of social security with a wage earners’ welfare state? The 
answer is no. Probably since the economic reforms of the 1980s and certainly since the 
1990s, the wage earners’ welfare state has ceased to exist in New Zealand (Castles 
1996). Trade protectionism is no longer actively pursued and the highly regulated wage 
setting system which once formed the basis of the ‘family wage’ was dismantled by the 
conservative government in 1991. A shift in emphasis had probably already been taking 
place for some time. The introduction of the family tax credits in the early 1980s, for 
instance, can be seen in this light, “as either a method for reducing poverty among low 
paid workers or allowing employers to reduce pay rates for competitive advantage rea-
sons in the knowledge that the government subsidy will maintain take home pay” 
(Stephens 1996: 465). Already back then, poverty was no longer something to be tack-
led within the labour market but rather through income transfers. Some of the ‘demand’ 
factors behind the wage earners’ welfare state have undergone change, too. Although 
New Zealand is currently enjoying record-low unemployment rates, among the lowest 
rates in the OECD, full employment is no longer a permanent condition. Family struc-
tures and employment patterns have changed. Women have moved into the work force 
over the last decades and care work is increasingly provided by public and private insti-
tutions instead of the family. Next to the United States, the country has the highest rate 
of single-parent families in the world. This share has risen from 14.1 per cent in 1981 to 
24.5 per cent in 1991 and 29.2 per cent in 2001 (MSD 2004b: 19). Home ownership, 
another important pillar of the post-war regime, albeit still high by international stan-
dards, is also in decline (PRG 2003: 37). Thus, although not all of the elements that 
once characterized the wage earners’ welfare state are completely gone, they do no 
longer form a coherent arrangement. Instead of regulating the market directly, the em-
phasis today is on market conformity of social policies. Stripped of its protective belt in 
form of a wage earners’ welfare state, the contemporary system of social protection 
could now better be described as purely residual. 
5. CONCLUSION 
New Zealand’s welfare state has not proven resilient to attacks. After numerous reforms 
– most of which retrenchment measures – it must now be called residual, or ‘liberal’. 
Not only has the ‘wage earners’ welfare state’ ceased to exist but individual entitle-
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ments to cash transfers and social services have been lowered and based more clearly on 
the condition of need, too. 
Even if the question as to what accounts for welfare state retrenchment cannot be 
fully answered in a case-study format, the New Zealand case still highlights a number of 
important points which are relevant for welfare state reform at large. 
A ‘globalisation effect’ is clearly visible with regard to the demise of the wage earn-
ers’ welfare state. The highly regulated economy, with a ‘family wage’ to tackle ine-
quality and poverty within the labour market, could only work under the conditions of 
trade protectionism. Tariff barriers and import licenses allowed employers to pay high 
wages even in sectors which were not internationally competitive. When Labour started 
to dismantle these trade barriers in the 1980s, the other pillars of ‘social security by 
other means’ started to crumble, too. This conclusion, however, is highly contingent on 
the specific political economy of Australasia. Globalisation should not be expected to 
have exactly the same effect in the OECD-countries of the Northern hemisphere. 
The impact of domestic economic pressure should not be underestimated. In com-
parative research, economic performance indicators, especially unemployment (see ta-
ble 1 and figure 1), have proved powerful determinants of welfare state change, with a 
positive effect on social expenditure (e.g. Kittel/Obinger 2003) and a negative effect on 
benefit replacement rates (Korpi/Palme 2003). In New Zealand, the ‘big bang’ reforms 
of the early 1990s coincided roughly with the peak in unemployment and a massive 
budgetary crisis. This does not mean, though, that welfare reforms are inevitable and 
follow a ‘logic of no alternative’. Economic problems might as well only make it easier 
to justify wide-ranging retrenchment to the public. Either way, a closer look at the mo-
tives of political actors is warranted; and this is where the position of parties and politi-
cians on the ideological spectrum come into play.  
There is one key reason why – despite economic problems – the National Party did 
not embark on a New Right course similar to Margaret Thatcher’s in the early 1980s: 
Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. He was a populist oriented towards the interests of 
‘the ordinary bloke’ and, with respect to his policy positions, increasingly isolated 
within his own party facing an ever stronger market-liberal faction. Muldoon was “in 
the party, but not of it” (James 1986: 87). His relative success in general elections and 
his autocratic leadership style, though, prevented National from moving further to a 
‘more market’ position. Surprisingly, it was Labour who made the move to ‘more mar-
ket’ in the 1980s. Rogernomics entailed policies more suitable for a secular conserva-
tive party than for a traditional labour party. However, this shift to the right was far 
from being unanimously accepted among Labour politicians, a fact which became clear 
when Minister of Finance Roger Douglas proposed an overhaul of the welfare state. 
Apart from the cuts in pensions, the welfare state was largely shielded from retrench-
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ment under Labour. This changed under National, by then under the influence of the 
neo-liberal faction around Ruth Richardson. But although large-scale retrenchment oc-
curred, the window of opportunity for free-market reforms was short; Richardson was 
replaced as early as in 1993 and in 1996 New Zealand First entered cabinet.  
The introduction of proportional representation (with a relatively low threshold) 
transformed New Zealand’s party system pretty much as was expected. NZF was but 
one of a number of small parties that entered the arena during the transition period from 
1993 to 1996. New Zealand First revived some aspects of the populism of the Muldoon 
years. While still a member of the Bolger government, NZF leader Winston Peters was 
already a strong critic of National’s free market reforms, which lead to his dismissal 
from Cabinet in 1991. During the coalition, NZF forced National to move closer to the 
centre in social policy. To the left, under Helen Clark’s leadership, Labour shifted away 
from the neo-liberalism of the 1980s and back to a more pragmatic position. Overall, 
ideological positions clearly did matter for social policy decisions during the period 
1975-2004, though behind the party labels a great deal of volatility and internal strife 
were the rule.  
Contrary to what might be expected in a highly centralised political system, ‘blame 
avoidance’ did not play an important role for retrenchment. According to some scholars, 
politics of welfare state retrenchment in democratic political systems have to be seen as 
‘the politics of blame avoidance’ (Weaver 1986; Pierson 1994). Since entitlement cuts 
are deeply unpopular but politicians nonetheless want to be re-elected, ‘blame avoid-
ance’ is indispensable whenever cut backs are on the agenda. Paul Pierson (1994) ar-
gues that, in this context, political institutions have an ambiguous effect on the potential 
for welfare state retrenchment. On the one hand, institutions may concentrate power in 
the hand of reformers who then do not have to compromise very much on their goals. 
On the other hand, concentration of power entails concentration of accountability and, 
because of the low popularity of cutbacks, governments may be unable to ‘avoid blame’ 
and thus shy away from deep cuts in order not to lose office.  
New Zealand’s almost prototypical Westminster system before 1993, with high con-
centration of power and accountability (with a 3-year electoral term), makes it a crucial 
case for Pierson’s institutional claim about retrenchment. There is no doubt that re-
trenchment in New Zealand was unpopular; the fate of the superannuation surcharge is a 
case in point. However, politicians do not seem to have been trying to hide the cuts in 
technical details; most of the time they were clearly visible to the public (cf. Mackay 
2003: 88). Although it became evident that the 1991 ‘Mother of all Budgets’ was not an 
election-winning formula, the National government under Prime Minister Bolger, with 
the clear will to cut back entitlements, used the opportunities provided by the central-
ised political system and pushed the reforms through. Although ‘blame avoidance’ may 
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have taken place in other countries, the case of New Zealand casts doubt on the claim 
that it helps explain why retrenchment does or does not occurs. There is little evidence 
of an ‘accountability effect’. The ‘concentration of power effect’ seems to be more im-
portant. One could argue, however, that the failure to avoid blame ultimately led to elec-
toral system change. 
In theory, the change in the electoral system from First-Past-the-Post to proportional 
representation (PR) can be regarded as a social experiment, a unique opportunity to 
study the effects of electoral system changes. When it comes to policy effects, there is 
no agreement in the literature on what to expect from the new electoral system. It is 
unclear whether PR – particularly in terms of the usual consequences for party systems 
and cabinet types – matters at all for social policy (Armingeon 2002; Boston 1994; Cas-
tles 1994; but see Persson/Tabellini 2003). In the language of veto player theory (Tsebe-
lis 2002), PR makes multi-party governments, and hence the presence of a higher num-
ber of veto players (i.e. the coalition partners), more likely. As a result, radical policy 
change becomes less likely, ceteris paribus. In the case of New Zealand, with New Zea-
land First entering cabinet in 1996, the number of veto players increased by one. As 
already mentioned, the policy distance between National and NZF on welfare state is-
sues was considerable. Arguably, the chance for wide-ranging retrenchment was there-
fore significantly diminished. NZF’s great influence on policy must also be seen in the 
light of the particular election result in 1996 that gave them the role of a pivotal party 
and ‘king maker’ (Boston/McLeay 1997; Brechtel/Kaiser 1999). This position allowed 
NZF to move policy – particularly social policy – towards the centre. From 1998, coali-
tion governments have been the rule, too, but the two centre-left minority governments 
since 1999 have contained parties that were whose policies were much closer to each 
other. Here, the ‘stabilising effect’ of more veto players should be less visible. Hence, 
what we can see is that the policy effects of the electoral system change are far from 
straightforward and probably interrelated with the issue of party competition and gov-
ernment formation. 
On the whole, this discussion demonstrates that an explicitly multicausal explanation 
– taking the economic situation, party ideologies and the effects of political institutions 
into account – is necessary. More attention should be paid to the motives for reforms, 
namely economic pressure and partisan ideology as well as possible interaction between 
these two variables. Quantitative research on comparative welfare state development 
has indeed shown that most of the time single factors account for only a fraction of what 
is going on. Of course, this is something qualitative researchers should not ignore, ei-
ther.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 3: Overview of Major Reforms, 1975-2004 
Year Reform 
1975-1984: The Muldoon Years 
1976 National Superannuation: Universal pension at age 60 
1976-83 Introduction of various tax rebates for families 
1977 Domestic Purposes Benefit reductions 
1979 Calculation base of pension reduced from gross to net average wage level 
1979 Last increase of the universal Family Benefit before its abolition in 1991 
1979 1979 Budget: some benefit reductions 
1982 ACC replacement rate reduced, higher maximum lump-sum compensation in some cases 
1983 Area Health Boards Act: decentralisation of the health sector 
1984-1990: First Cuts Under Labour 
1984 Family Care: wage supplement for low-income families 
1984-89 Establishment of 14 Area Health Boards (AHBs) 
1985 Superannuation tax surcharge: claw-back tax on higher-income pensioners 
1985 ALMP and wage subsidy schemes replaced with a single training scheme (Access) 
1986 Family Support and Guaranteed Minimum Family Income: Means-tested family tax credits 
1988-90 Tax concessions for private and occupational pensions abolished 
1989 New pension indexation formula to curb future increases 
1990 Government announces rising pension age 
1990-1999: Conservative Retrenchment 
1990-91 Major benefit cuts 
1991 Family Benefit abolished 
1991 Pension: Eligibility age to rise to 65 until 2001; increased claw-back through surcharge; no inflation adjustment in 1991 and 1992 
1991 Employment Contracts Act: Deregulation of industrial relations 
1992 User charges for hospital services – abolished in 1993; tighter targeting of health subsidies 
1992 Accident Compensation: various retrenchment measures 
1993 Health and Disability Services Act: comprehensive reorganisation of the health sector; pur-chaser-provider split, quasi-market, opening up to private providers 
1993 Accommodation Supplement: targeted benefits in housing instead of income-related rents 
1993 Multi-party Accord on Superannuation 
1996 Independent Family Tax Credit: tax-credit for working families 
1997 Health reforms: partial reversal of the profit-oriented structure introduced in 1993; free GP services and pharmaceuticals for children under six 
1998 Superannuation surcharge abolished 
1998 Community Wage: workfare scheme for the unemployed and sickness beneficiaries 
1999 Privatisation of accident compensation – reversed in 2000 
1999-2004: Reversal and Reconstruction 
2000-02 Reversal of reforms in housing, pensions and accident compensation; repeal of tough work tests for lone mothers and sickness beneficiaries 
2000 Health policy: purchaser-provider split abolished 
2001 NZ Superannuation Fund to pre-fund part of the future pension expenditure 
2002 Paid parental leave 
2004 Working for Families package: Expansion of family benefits and childcare subsidies 
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